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TRIPS AGREEMENT ARTICLE 31(B): THE NEED FOR 
REVISION 
Ann Marie Effingham* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American pharmaceutical companies spend more than fifty 
billion dollars per year in research and development (“R&D”) in order 
to bring new drugs to market.1  This immense investment is justified by 
the need to create a “blockbuster drug” that will solve a medical issue 
prevalent among millions of people.2  These blockbuster drugs 
generate media attention, create hype among medical professionals, 
and generate enormous sales.3  The idea is that the revenue from 
several blockbuster drugs makes up for all the other disappointments 
in the R&D process.4 
In addition to creating blockbuster drugs, American 
pharmaceutical companies rely on patent protection in order to 
safeguard their investments in R&D.5  While the American patent 
protection model is sufficient to protect domestic patents, it is 
disrupted when American patents are used outside of the United 
States.6 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2013, The College 
of New Jersey.  Special thanks to Professor David Opderbeck for his guidance 
throughout the writing of this Comment. 
 1  See PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM., 2015 BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH 
INDUSTRY PROFILE vi (2015), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/ 
2014_PhRMA_PROFILE.pdf [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Research].  
 2  Neil F. Hazaray, Note, Do the Benefits Outweigh the Risks? The Legal, Business, and 
Ethical Ramifications of Pulling a Blockbuster Drug Off the Market, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 
115, 117–18 (2007) (defining “blockbuster drug”).  
 3  Id. at 118. 
 4  See David W. Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 501, 519 (2005) (explaining that pharmaceutical companies depend on 
blockbuster drugs to recoup R&D costs).  
 5  Pharmaceutical Research, supra note 1, at 28 (“IP-intensive manufacturing 
industries are defined as those industries that are more R&D-intensive than the 
average for all manufacturing sectors, and which rely heavily on patents to produce 
innovations.”). 
 6  Jamie Feldman, Note, Compulsory Licenses: The Danger Behind the Current Practice, 
8 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 137, 141 (2009). 
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In an effort to standardize intellectual property protection across 
the world, the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS 
Agreement”), set forth the minimum levels of protection that 
members of the WTO must enact.7  The TRIPS Agreement details 
minimum standards of protection for intellectual property rights 
including: copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, and patents.8  Each of these elements is defined along with the 
rights afforded each element and the permissible exceptions.9  
Likewise, the TRIPS Agreement provides guidelines for how member 
countries should enforce and settle disputes over intellectual property 
rights.10  The provisions also articulate the minimum duration of 
protection for each element.11 
Despite these minimum levels of protection with which WTO 
member countries must comply, the TRIPS Agreement provides 
exceptions in certain exigent circumstances.  Specifically, Article 31(b) 
of the TRIPS Agreement allows for WTO members to use the subject 
matter of patents without the patent holder’s authorization in times of 
national emergency.12  This compulsory licensing13 scheme has allowed 
less developed countries (LDCs)14 to obtain patent licenses to generic 
drugs that help solve national emergencies.15  In some ways, this 
 
 7  Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2016).  
 8  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ 
legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 9  See also Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). 
 10  See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 7. 
 11  Id. 
 12  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b). 
 13  License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “compulsory license” 
as “[a] statutorily created license that allows certain people to pay a royalty and use an 
invention without the patentee’s permission”). 
 14  The WTO differentiates between “developing countries” and “least developed 
countries.”  Compare The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/appendix/appendix-
b.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) (click “D” alphabetical tab and scroll to “developing 
countries”), with The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/appendix/appendix-
b.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) (click “L” alphabetical tab and scroll to “less 
developed countries”).  For purposes of this Comment, “LDCs” refers to both 
developing countries and least developed countries.  
 15  Riadh Quadir, Note, Patent Stalemate? The WTO’s Essential Medicines Impasse 
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compulsory licensing scheme has proven to be beneficial to LDCs that 
are affected by national health emergencies, but in other instances, 
LDCs are exploiting the availability of compulsory licenses. 
For example, in the 1990s, the World Bank projected that 1.2 
million Brazilians would be living with Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) by 
the year 2000.16  In order to rid the country of its projected path of 
disease, Brazil negotiated with American pharmaceutical company 
Abbott Laboratories by threatening to obtain a compulsory license if 
the parties could not reach a reduced price settlement for 
antiretroviral medicines used to treat HIV/AIDS.17  This threat of a 
compulsory license was a way for LDCs to get developed countries to 
help them deal with national health crises.18 
Conversely, there are instances in which LDCs have begun to 
exploit the Article 31(b) exception by obtaining generic patent 
information to treat diseases that are outside the scope of what many 
developed countries consider true national emergencies.  For 
example, in late 2006, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for two 
antiretroviral drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS without trying to negotiate 
a lower price settlement as in the Brazilian example.19  Thailand then 
issued a compulsory license for a heart disease drug in 2007,20 and in 
2008 it issued four compulsory licenses for cancer-treating drugs.21  
Although Thailand’s usage of compulsory licenses in this way does not 
per se violate Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, using compulsory 
licenses in this manner does not align with the goal of the TRIPS 
Agreement: supporting public health during times of national 
emergencies.22  This is because identified cases of HIV/AIDS, cancer, 
and heart disease—albeit great in number—should not all be treated 
as national emergencies warranting the use of compulsory licensing. 
 
between Pharmas and Least Developed Countries, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 437, 454 (2009). 
 16  Brazil – AIDS & STD Control III – Result Story, THE WORLD BANK, 
http://go.worldbank.org/WTXL9OB2H0 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).  
 17  Jennifer Bjornberg, Comment, Brazil’s Recent Threat on Abbott’s Patent: Resolution 
or Retaliation?, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 224 (2006). 
 18  Id. at 210–11; see also Quadir, supra note 15, at 439, 459–60.  
 19  Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Thailand Presents Report on Compulsory Licensing 
Experience, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 12, 2007), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2007/03/12/thailand-presents-report-on-compulsory-licensing-
experience/. 
 20  Id.  
 21  Sinfah Tunsarawuth, New Thai Minister May Review Compulsory Licenses on Cancer 
Drugs, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 8, 2008), http://www.ip-watch.org/2008/02/08/ 
new-thai-minister-may-review-compulsory-licences-on-cancer-drugs/.  
 22  Quadir, supra note 15, at 452. 
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This Comment will cover how the TRIPS Agreement can be 
amended in order to make it function more effectively, thereby 
encouraging LDCs to take advantage of the Article 31(b) exception 
and simultaneously disallowing other LDCs from misusing the 
exception.  Part II of this Comment discusses the historical 
development of international intellectual property rights and how it 
has evolved into the present-day understanding of the TRIPS 
Agreement.  Additionally, Part III examines what, in particular, the 
TRIPS Agreement protects and how its shortfalls led to the Doha 
Declaration.23  Part IV concludes with a discussion of the drafters’ 
purposes and goals when authoring the TRIPS Agreement.  Part V 
compares American pharmaceutical industries’ interests in a for-profit 
business model with LDCs’ interests in managing national health crises 
by using compulsory licenses.  Part VI introduces instances in which 
Thailand has used compulsory licenses in ways that do not align with 
the goals of the TRIPS Agreement.  Despite being a moderate-income 
developing country, Thailand is not further developing the domestic 
infrastructure needed to create its own medicines.24  Instead, it is 
relying on compulsory licenses for medicines that treat illnesses and 
diseases that most would not consider to be national emergencies 
necessitating use of Article 31(b).25  Part VII analyzes how American 
pharmaceutical companies can incentivize LDCs to take advantage of 
the TRIPS Article 31(b) exception by proposing two solutions: (1) a 
regulatory solution and (2) a patent lifespan extension solution.  Part 
VII also analyzes how the WTO can discourage LDCs from exploiting 
the TRIPS Article 31(b) exception through the formation of an 
international committee to investigate allegations of countries’ misuse 
of compulsory licensing.  Part VIII concludes. 
 
 23  The Doha Declaration confirmed and endorsed that the purpose of the TRIPS 
Agreement is to support public health by promoting access to medicines.  The major 
change promulgated at the Doha Declaration was the Paragraph 6 Decision, which 
effectively allows LDCs that do not have the manufacturing capabilities to issue a 
compulsory license to a developed country that does have the capabilities to export 
such medicines.  See infra Part III. 
 24  Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health 
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended 
TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921, 928 (2007), 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2490&context=faculty_
scholarship (“The growing ability of some middle-income developing countries to 
produce low-cost generic medicines under these regimes—notably in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, India, Thailand, Egypt, Indonesia, Taiwan and South Korea—made it 
increasingly possible for even poor states to obtain certain low-cost generic medicines 
on the world market, whether such products were on or off patents.”).  
 25  See infra Part IV.  
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II. FROM THE PARIS CONVENTION TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: THE 
ORIGIN OF COMPULSORY LICENSES 
In 1883, one of the first international intellectual property treaties 
was formed: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (“Paris Convention”).26  The treaty pioneered patent 
protection and has served as a foundation for future international 
intellectual property agreements.27  Today, 167 countries participate in 
the Paris Convention.28  In 1967, the United Nations (U.N.) created 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), which 
supervises international intellectual property matters.29  WIPO has also 
acted as the administrator to the Paris Convention as it has grown.30  
Despite WIPO’s general success, it is inadequate to deal with 
international patent policies due to its inability to effectively and 
efficiently adjudicate intellectual property disputes.31  As the leaders in 
patentable products, developed countries have tried to use WIPO to 
authorize strong protection for international patents.32  In contrast, 
LDCs pushed for a more malleable patent scheme that could work with 
their societies’ growth and innovation as their countries continued to 
develop.33 
To resolve WIPO’s inadequacies, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was formed as a treaty in 1947, but by the 
1970s it evolved into an international trade organization.34  The 
developed countries’ new method to get LDCs to comply with their 
international patents was to tie patent protection to trade policy.35  
 
 26  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as last revised July 14, 1967), 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=287556. 
 27  Quadir, supra note 15, at 447. 
 28  WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) 
(enumerating all contracting countries). 
 29  Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (as amended Sept. 28, 1979), 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention; see also Elaine B. Gin, International 
Copyright Law: Beyond the WIPO & TRIPS Debate, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 763, 
780–81 (2004). 
 30  See Gin, supra note 29, at 780–82. 
 31  Id. at 780; see also Monique L. Cordray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 121, 131 (1994).  
 32  See Gin, supra note 29, at 780–82. 
 33  Id. at 781–82.  
 34  ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF 
THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 70–71, 73 (1993). 
 35  See Vandana Date, Global “Development” and Its Environmental RamificationsThe 
Interlinking of Ecologically Sustainable Development and Intellectual Property Rights, 27 
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Because LDCs needed trade to fuel their economic and social growth, 
they were required to comply with this stricter view of patent 
protection.36 
In 1995, GATT developed into the WTO, which was charged with 
“reducing trade barriers and creating a robust international trading 
platform.”37  This reorganization of the WTO further engrained the 
connection between trade and patent policy.38  As part of the 
reorganization of GATT, the TRIPS Agreement was created.39  The 
WTO is authorized to supervise the TRIPS Agreement and settle 
disputes between member countries using its Dispute Settlement Body 
(DSB).40  Today, 162 countries are WTO members.41 
All member countries must abide by the TRIPS Agreement, which 
established minimum levels of copyright, trademark, and patent 
protection.42  Despite the differences of opinion between LDCs and 
developed countries regarding intellectual property protection, the 
TRIPS Agreement has created a workable international intellectual 
property framework that has proven successful.43  The TRIPS 
Agreement’s minimum standards of intellectual property protection 
are required to be upheld throughout all member countries regardless 
of their domestic laws.44 
A. Article 31(b) and Other Exceptions to the TRIPS Agreement 
While this Comment focuses on the Article 31(b) exception, it is 
important to appreciate the various other exceptions to the TRIPS 
Agreement in order to best understand their interrelatedness.  Article 
7 stresses the importance of technological innovation in a manner 
 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 631, 659–61 (1997). 
 36  Id.  
 37  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994), http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/03-fa.pdf; Quadir, supra note 15, at 448. 
 38  Quadir, supra note 15, at 448.  
 39  Id. 
 40  Cynthia M. Ho, A New World Order for Addressing Patent Rights and Public Health, 
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469, 1470 (2007).  
 41  Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Members and Observers, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 
11, 2016).  
 42  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8; Samira Guennif & Julien Chaisse, Present 
Stakes Around Patent Political Economy: Legal and Economic Lessons from the Pharmaceutical 
Patent Rights in India, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 67 (2007). 
 43  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8; see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra note 42, at 
67. 
 44  CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 8 (2007). 
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conducive to social and economic welfare.45  Article 8 generally allows 
member countries to take any action to protect the public that are 
“necessary” and “consistent” with the TRIPS Agreement,46 and Article 
27(2) acknowledges the balancing act between the need for public 
health and intellectual property protection.47  Article 31(b) permits 
patent use without the authorization of the right and articulates the 
requirements of obtaining a compulsory license.48 
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement states: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and 
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in 
a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations.49 
The enforcement of intellectual property protection seeks to uphold 
social and economic welfare.  Arguably, this section implies that the 
TRIPS Agreement consists of more than rules and several exceptions 
that allow a country to issue a compulsory license and import 
medicines whenever exigent circumstances exist.50  This section, when 
taken in tandem with other sections, encompasses the TRIPS 
Agreement’s broad scope to not only help a country use 
technological—in this case patent-related—advances to its advantage, 
but to also benefit the producers of the information.51 
Article 8 states, “[m]embers may, in formulating or amending 
their laws and regulations, adopt measures necessary to protect public 
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of 
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.”52  This broad language seems to indicate 
that members can take any action so long as it is “necessary” and 
 
 45  See infra notes 49–50. 
 46  See infra notes 52–53. 
 47  See infra notes 54–56. 
 48  See infra notes 58–61. 
 49  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 7 (emphasis added).  
 50  Id.; see also CARLOS M. CORREA & ABDULQAWI A. YUSUF, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 12 (1998); Amir Attaran, The Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options 
Under WTO Law, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859, 871 (2002). 
 51  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.  
 52  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 8.  
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“consistent” with the TRIPS Agreement.53 
Article 27(2) states: 
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, 
the prevention within their territory of the commercial 
exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public 
or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the 
environment, provided that such exclusion is not made 
merely because the exploitation is prohibited by their 
law.54 
This Article acknowledges the balancing between intellectual property 
protection and the need for public health.55  Some argue that this 
Article should allow HIV/AIDS medicines to be exempt from the 
TRIPS Agreement.56  Others argue that this Article simply prohibits 
hazardous inventions from being patentable.57 
Article 31(b) provides, in relevant part, that patent use without 
authorization of the right holder: 
[M]ay only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed 
user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right 
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and 
that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable 
period of time.  This requirement may be waived by a 
Member in the case of a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-
commercial use.  In situations of national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder 
shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably 
practicable.  In the case of public non-commercial use, where 
the government or contractor, without making a patent 
search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a 
valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the 
right holder shall be informed promptly . . . .58 
This Article is the most controversial of the exceptions to the TRIPS 
Agreement.59  In effect, it allows LDCs, under certain circumstances, to 
 
 53  Id.; CORREA, supra note 44, at 106. 
 54  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 27(2).  
 55  Id.; see also Attaran, supra note 50, at 871.  
 56  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 27(2); see also Attaran, supra note 50, at 
871. 
 57  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 27(2); see also Attaran, supra note 50, at 
871. 
 58  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 42, at art. 31(b).   
 59  See CORREA, supra note 44, at 313. 
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use member countries’ patents without consent.60  This exception is 
commonly referred to as “compulsory licensing.”61  The goal of Article 
31(b) is to allow an LDC to manufacture a generic drug domestically 
for less than the cost of purchasing and importing it from the foreign 
pharmaceutical company.62 
B. When and How Compulsory Licenses Are Used 
Article 31(b) articulates how a compulsory license is obtained.63  
It requires an LDC to negotiate with the patent holder to purchase 
pharmaceuticals at a reasonable price and within a reasonable amount 
of time.64  This requirement may be waived if an LDC has a national 
emergency, is facing other circumstances of extreme urgency, or plans 
to use the pharmaceuticals for a public, non-commercial use.65  These 
exceptions to the negotiation requirement allow LDCs to completely 
bypass bargaining with the patent holder and, instead, to issue 
compulsory licenses without prior notice.66 
Bypassing bargaining with the patent holder and issuing a 
compulsory license imposes on the LDC several requirements that 
must be met in order to obtain the patented information.  To issue a 
compulsory license under the Article 31(b) list of exemptions, an LDC 
must first notify the patent holder.67  Second, an LDC must be able to 
domestically manufacture the pharmaceutical for which it issues a 
compulsory license.68  Domestic manufacturing requires a country to 
have sufficient industrial and technological bases, such as banking 
institutions, transportation, and other assets that are necessary to 
domestic industry.69  Third, an LDC must reasonably compensate the 
 
 60  Id.  
 61  Id.  
 62  Id.  
 63  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra 
note 42, at 80. 
 64  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra 
note 42, at 80. 
 65  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra 
note 42, at 80. 
 66  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also Guennif & Chaisse, supra 
note 42, at 80. 
 67  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(b); see also CORREA, supra note 44, at 
313. 
 68  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(f); CORREA, supra note 44, at 313.  But 
see infra note 79 (explaining that the Paragraph 6 Decision did away with this 
requirement in 2003).  
 69  Zita Lazzarini, Essay, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options 
Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, 134 (2003).  
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patent holder.70  There is no precise formula to determine reasonable 
compensation.71  Adequate remuneration is determined by taking into 
account the economic value conferred upon the importing LDC by the 
developed country in granting the compulsory license.72 
III. THE DOHA DECLARATION 
In 2001, several years after the TRIPS Agreement took effect, the 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (“Doha 
Declaration”) was promulgated in order to clarify and possibly amend 
the TRIPS Agreement.73  The Doha Declaration reaffirmed that the 
TRIPS Agreement’s “interpretation should support public health by 
promoting access to existing medicines and the creation of new 
medicines.”74  While the Doha Declaration helped promote the TRIPS 
Agreement’s overall purpose, it failed to shed light on the meaning of 
“national emergency” or “other circumstances of extreme urgency.”75 
One major change that the Doha Declaration effectuated was the 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 (“Paragraph 6 Decision” or “the 
Decision”).  At the Doha Declaration, many LDCs voiced complaints 
that they could not take advantage of the Article 31 exception because 
it required domestic production—resources and infrastructure—to 
which LDCs did not have access.76  This requirement, they criticized, 
inhibited their ability to access medicines through compulsory 
licenses.77  In response to these complaints, the Council for the TRIPS 
Agreement issued the Paragraph 6 Decision.78  The Paragraph 6 
 
 70  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31(h). 
 71  See id. 
 72  Edited by Sean D. Murphy, Modification of WTO Rules on Protection of 
Pharmaceuticals, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 981, 982 (2003).  
 73  WTO, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 
I.L.M. 755 (2002), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/ 
mindecl_e.pdf [hereinafter Doha Declaration].  
 74  Quadir, supra note 15, at 453.   
 75  Bjornberg, supra note 17, at 206. 
 76  Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 929–30. 
 77  Id.  
 78  See WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14 
November 2001, para. 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002), 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf 
[hereinafter WTO Declaration].  As noted by the WTO:  
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making 
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We 
instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this 
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.  
Id.  
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Decision waived the Article 31(b) domestic market requirement.79  In 
effect, the Decision allows member countries that do not have an 
ability to domestically produce a drug to issue a compulsory license for 
pharmaceutical drugs and to issue a compulsory license to developed 
countries in order to export the pharmaceutical drugs.80  It also 
requires the importing LDC to issue a compulsory license to import 
the pharmaceutical drugs.81  As of this Comment’s writing, WTO 
members are deciding whether to make this waiver a permanent 
amendment to the TRIPS Agreement.82 
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 
The WTO delegates’ intent behind the TRIPS Agreement can be 
summarized in three main points: (1) to protect developed countries’ 
R&D investments; (2) to promote industry in developing countries; 
and (3) to advance public health, especially in developing countries.83  
American pharmaceutical companies spend more than fifty billion 
dollars in R&D annually in order to bring new medicines to market.84  
If generic pharmaceutical companies in foreign markets are able to 
circumvent American patent protection by continuing to import these 
medicines, there is little incentive for American pharmaceutical 
companies to develop drugs that will help these developing countries.  
Thus, the WTO sought to promote R&D by instituting minimum levels 
of worldwide patent protection.85 
 
 
 
 79  Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Doc. WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 
2003) [hereinafter Paragraph 6 Decision]; see also Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, 
at 932. 
 80  Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 79; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 932. 
 81  Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 79; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 932. 
 82  Paragraph 6 Decision, supra note 79; Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 932. 
 83  See CORREA & YUSUF, supra note 50, at 10–15; SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, 
PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 12162 (2003); 
Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE 
L.J., no. 2, 2002, at 57, 58 (2002); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing 
Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 49 (2002); Grace K. Avedissian, 
Note and Comment, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward Compulsory 
Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of “Super-Terrorism,” 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
237, 251 (2002); Understanding the WTO: The Agreements: Intellectual Property: Protection 
and Enforcement, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/ 
agrm7_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) [hereinafter TRIPS Explanation]. 
 84  Pharmaceutical Research, supra note 1, at 58.  
 85  See CORREA & YUSUF, supra note 50, at 10–15; SELL, supra note 83; Sykes, supra 
note 83.  
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Another goal of the TRIPS Agreement is to promote industry, 
especially in developing countries.86  By protecting intellectual 
property, trade barriers should theoretically decrease, which, in turn, 
would increase developing countries’ growth and development.87  
Thus, the WTO sought to promote industry by creating international 
patent protection.88 
The final, and arguably the most important, goal of the TRIPS 
Agreement is to advance public health.89  In connection with the first 
goal that sought to protect R&D, this goal “attempts to strike a delicate 
balance between the short-term objective of providing access to 
existing medicines and the long-term objective of developing new 
medicines through incentives for future Research and Development.”90  
Additionally, the TRIPS Counsel acknowledged the necessity of 
“maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and 
regulations in order to enable [the developing countries] to create a 
sound and viable technological base.”91  Thus, while the WTO wanted 
to allow compulsory licenses to combat public health crises, it 
simultaneously wanted to promote developing countries’ self-
sustainability through the creation of their own medicines.92  These 
twin aims—self-sustainability and health crisis management—are 
clearly at odds with the way compulsory licenses are currently being 
used.93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 86  Ansari, supra note 83, at 58–59 (“Poor international intellectual property 
protection has been analogized to trade barriers . . . .”); TRIPS Explanation, supra note 
83.  
 87  Ansari, supra note 83, at 58–59. 
 88  Id.  
 89  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 8.  
 90  See CORREA & YUSUF, supra note 50, at 11 (citing Arnoldo Lacayo, Comment, 
Seeking a Balance: International Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, Public Health Crises, and 
the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 295, 312 (2002)); 
Avedissian, supra note 83, at 251. 
 91  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at preamble.  
 92  Id.  
 93  See infra Part IV. 
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V. COMPETING INTERESTS BETWEEN AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPANIES & LDCS 
A. American Pharmaceutical Companies’ Interests 
Pharmaceutical companies research, develop, and market 
medicines.94  The largest pharmaceutical companies are located in 
Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and the United States—all developed 
countries.95  American pharmaceutical companies alone are 
responsible for bringing 300 new medicines that treat 150 conditions 
to market since 1990.96  As such, they are partially responsible for the 
improvement of peoples’ quality of life worldwide.97 
Pharmaceutical companies’ incentive to bring new medicines to 
market is closely tied to policy—specifically, policy that promotes 
“effective use of intellectual property.”98  Pharmaceutical companies 
have a strong interest in policy because intellectual property policy, 
more specifically patent protection, allows these companies to recover 
the considerable R&D costs expended before a drug hits the market.99  
The cost for creating a new drug can range from at least $50 million to 
$600 million.100  This process includes “discovery, preclinical 
development, three phases of clinical trials, registration, and post-
marketing studies.”101  And if the drug passes these phases, 
pharmaceutical companies may spend up to an additional $200 million 
on marketing.102 
Pharmaceutical companies depend on patents in order to protect 
these large investments.103  Predictable patent protection is especially 
important because it allows pharmaceutical companies the ability to 
determine in which markets advertising would most likely allow them 
 
 94  See Bjornberg, supra note 17, at 209–10; see also Pharmaceutical Research, supra 
note 1, at 17; PHARMA. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM., THE FACTS ABOUT PHARMACEUTICAL 
MARKETING & PROMOTION 17 (2008), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/ 
pdf/marketing_and_promotion_facts_071108_final.pdf. 
 95  See Bjornberg, supra note 17, at 209–10; see also KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 52 (2000). 
 96  Quadir, supra note 15, at 441.  
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. at 441–42 
 99  Id. at 443. 
 100  Id. at 442. 
 101  Id. 
 102  Quadir, supra note 15, at 442. 
 103  Pier DeRoo, Note, “Public Non-Commercial Use” Compulsory Licensing for 
Pharmaceutical Drugs in Government Health Care Programs, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 347, 362 
(2011). 
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to recover their large R&D investments.104  Investments in R&D are 
largely profit-driven.105  Therefore, if a pharmaceutical company is 
unlikely to recover the costs of R&D due to an unstable domestic or 
international patent regime, it is unlikely to make the initial 
investment.106 
Governmental support of pharmaceutical companies and their 
profit-driven business models account for much of the reason that 
some developed countries have threatened or resorted to retaliatory 
acts.107  For example, the United States has put Thailand and Brazil on 
Section 301 of the Trade Act, a watch list for countries the United 
States believes to be noncompliant with U.S. intellectual property 
protection policies.108 
B. LDCs’ Interests 
Generally, LDCs are trying to increase their own economic 
growth.109  The U.N. supports this endeavor by funneling significant 
resources toward developing LDCs.110  Many of these resources come 
from, and are the product of, developed countries’ support of LDCs.111  
Notwithstanding developed countries’ financial contributions, LDCs 
still lack the infrastructure needed to provide predictable patent 
protection.112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 104  Quadir, supra note 15, at 443.  
 105  See id.  
 106  See id. 
 107  See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 24, at 980. 
 108  Id. 
 109  See U.N. Charter arts. 55–58, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/ 
uncharter.pdf; Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, 
TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 333, 334 
(2000). 
 110   Quadir, supra note 15, at 443–44. 
 111  Id.  
 112  Maria L. Mellino, Note, The TRIPS Agreement: Helping or Hurting Least Developed 
Countries’ Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals?, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 1349, 1352–53 (2010). 
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LDCs also have a strong interest in protecting the health of their 
citizens.113  The U.N. recognizes health as a fundamental right for all.114  
In fact, many advocates of LDCs’ accessing pharmaceutical drugs 
frequently cite this right in support of their objectives.115  Undoubtedly, 
there is a relationship between LDCs’ level of health and their ability 
to create the necessary infrastructure and to grow economically.116  
Unlike developed countries, LDCs do not have the monetary resources 
to address their countries’ health epidemics.117  Yet several countries, 
including Brazil, India, Malaysia, and Thailand, offer national 
treatment programs to citizens for little or no cost.118  Thus, despite the 
developmental efforts LDCs make, the treatment of HIV/AIDS in 
these countries is still a hindrance to their overall economic success 
given the interrelatedness between health and economic growth.119 
VI. THAILAND’S MISUSES OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ARTICLE 31(B) 
EXCEPTION 
Over the course of a short timespan, Thailand has issued 
compulsory licenses for a variety of different pharmaceutical drugs, 
including medicines that treat HIV/AIDS, heart disease, and cancer.120  
For example, in late 2006, Thailand issued compulsory licenses for two 
antiretroviral drugs used to treat HIV/AIDS.121  In 2007, Thailand 
 
 113  See David P. Fidler, Neither Science Nor Shamans: Globalization of Markets and Health 
in the Developing World, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 191–92, 195 (1999) 
(explaining that the economic gap between developed and developing countries is 
linked to health of their respective populations, with the physical and economic 
burdens of poor health falling disproportionately on developing countries); James 
Thuo Gathii, How Necessity May Preclude State Responsibility for Compulsory Licensing Under 
the TRIPS Agreement, 31 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 943, 958–59 (2006) (explaining 
that the HIV/AIDS epidemic has slowed economic progress because the disease 
usually infects individuals during the productive periods of their lives, and the care of 
these individuals falls on the families of those infected—further detracting from 
economic growth); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257, 292 (2006). 
 114  WORLD HEALTH ORG. CONST. pmbl., opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185, http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_constitution_ 
en.pdf; see also Fidler, supra note 113, at 194. 
 115  Quadir, supra note 15, at 444.  
 116  See Fidler, supra note 113, at 194–95. 
 117  See Sinfah Tunsarawuth, Governments Urged to Use Compulsory Licenses to Boost Drug 
Access, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 23, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/ 
2007/11/23/governments-urged-to-use-compulsory-licences-to-boost-drug-access/.  
 118  UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 2010 
160–63 (2010), http://www.unaids.org/globalreport/documents/20101123_ 
GlobalReport_full_en.pdf. 
 119  See Fidler, supra note 113, at 196–97; Gathii, supra note 113, at 961. 
 120  See infra Part VI. 
 121  Gerhardsen, supra note 19.  
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issued a compulsory license for a heart disease drug,122 and in 2008, it 
issued four compulsory licenses for cancer-treating drugs.123  These 
instances show Thailand’s trend toward using compulsory licenses in 
ways that do not align with the goals of the TRIPS Agreement.  First, in 
relation to HIV/AIDS medicines, Thailand began negotiating in 2006 
with Merck & Co. for Efavirenz.124  Nothing came of the negotiations, 
and in November 2006, Thailand issued a compulsory license for 
Efavirenz.125  Around the same time, Thailand began negotiating with 
Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) for Kaletra, an HIV/AIDS treatment.126  
After several months of negotiating, Thailand issued a compulsory 
license for Kaletra in 2007.127  Subsequently, Abbott withdrew seven 
pending pharmaceutical applications in Thailand.128  It is unclear what 
Abbott’s rationale was for withdrawing the applications, but Abbott 
denied that the withdrawals were in response to Thailand’s issuing the 
compulsory license.129  Many, however—including the Thai 
government—argue that Abbott withdrew the applications as 
retaliation toward Thailand.130  Abbott eventually reduced the price of 
Kaletra to the price that the Thai government commanded during 
negotiations.131 
Second, in relation to heart disease, Thailand issued a compulsory 
license in 2007 to Sanofi-Aventis for Plavix, a blood thinner medicine 
used to treat heart disease.132  This was the first time that a compulsory 
license was issued for a chronic disease,133 which therefore made the 
issuance even more controversial.134 
 
 122  Id. 
 123  Tunsarawuth, supra note 21. 
 124  See David Cronin, EU Split Arises Over Thai Effort to Obtain Cheaper Patented Drugs, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/ 
index.php?p=732; see also Gerhardsen, supra note 19. 
 125  See Gerhardsen, supra note 19.  
 126  Id. 
 127  See Cronin, supra note 124. 
 128  Abbott to Reduce Cost of Kaletra in Thailand, Other Developing Countries, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (June 11, 2009), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/morning-breakout/ 
dr00044189/ [hereinafter Reduce Cost of Kaletra]; Martin Vaughan, In Clash with 
Activists, Critics Charge Thailand Violation of Trade Rules, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 19, 
2007), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=569.  
 129  See Vaughan, supra note 128. 
 130  See Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from 
Fiction under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371, 444 (2009) (noting that the 
intent may be inferred from American pharma’s actions).  
 131  See Reduce Cost of Kaletra, supra note 128. 
 132  Gerhardsen, supra note 19.  
 133  As opposed to an infectious disease like HIV/AIDS. 
 134  JOANNA T. BROUGHER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES: 
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Third, in relation to cancer-treating medicines, Thailand issued 
four more compulsory licenses in 2008.135  It issued two to Novartis: one 
for Gleevec, a treatment for leukemia and gastrointestinal stromal 
tumors, and one for Femara, a treatment for breast cancer.136  Thailand 
also issued one compulsory license to Sanofi-Aventis for Taxotere, a 
treatment for lung and breast cancer.137  Finally, it issued one 
compulsory license to Roche for Tarceva, a treatment for lung 
cancer.138  Thailand’s continued issuance of compulsory licenses is 
creating immense tension between Thailand and pharmaceutical 
companies.139  It seems as though Thailand is using compulsory licenses 
as its default mechanism for obtaining access to medicines, indicating 
a disconnect between the TRIPS Agreement’s intended use and its 
actual use.140 
Thailand’s use of compulsory licenses for more commonplace 
diseases is not in accord with the problems that Article 31(b) intended 
to solve.  The TRIPS Agreement was implemented to strike a balance 
between providing access to medications for LDCs and developing new 
medicines through R&D.141  The delegates of the WTO that oversaw 
the TRIPS drafting process acknowledged that LDCs needed to create 
a sound technological base.142  By recognizing this as a goal, the drafters 
sought not only to provide immediate access to medicines for the 
short-term, but also to support LDC’s development toward creating 
their own medicines over the long-term.143 
To reiterate, Article 7 states that intellectual property protections 
should be instituted “in a manner conducive to social and economic 
welfare.”144  This implies that the TRIPS Agreement was enacted for a 
larger goal than simply allowing LDCs to issue compulsory licenses 
anytime there is a public health emergency.  Rather, it seeks to 
promote social and economic welfare for all member countries.  
Article 8(1) states that member countries should “promote the public 
 
BALANCING INNOVATION AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 182–83 (2014). 
 135  Tunsarawuth, supra note 21.  
 136  Id.  
 137  Id.  
 138  Id.  
 139  See Gerhardsen, supra note 19. 
 140  See id.   
 141  See CORREA & YUSUF, supra note 50, at 11. 
 142  Id.  
 143  Jessica J. Fayerman, Comment, The Spirit of TRIPS and the Importation of Medicines 
Made Under Compulsory License After the August 2003 TRIPS Council Agreement, 25 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 257, 268–69 (2004). 
 144  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 7.  
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interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development.”145  While the TRIPS Agreement allows for 
compulsory licenses, one of its main goals at the time of adoption was 
to help bolster member countries’ economic and technological 
development.146 
Thailand’s continued use of compulsory licenses circumvents 
Articles 7 and 8, which call for intellectual property protection while 
also encouraging economic welfare.  Rather than create its own 
infrastructure to complete the R&D process of its own pharmaceutical 
drugs, Thailand instead resorts to issuing compulsory licenses for the 
patent formula and then manufacturing them domestically, leaving 
developing countries to bear the R&D cost burden.147 
Article 31 does not expressly prohibit the types of activity in which 
Thailand engages.148  Article 31(b) only applies in cases “of a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of 
public non-commercial use.”149  When taken in concert with Articles 7 
and 8, however, Article 31(b) is meant to be a rare exception to the 
general, strict patent protection regime.150  It is meant for situations 
 
 145  Id. at art. 8. 
 146  Id. at art. 7. 
 147  See Thai Health Ministry Breaks Patent, Issues Compulsory License for Abbott’s 
Antiretroviral Kaletra, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 11, 2009), 
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/morning-breakout/dr00042592/; see also Dina Halajian, 
Note, Inadequacy of TRIPS & the Compulsory License: Why Broad Compulsory Licensing Is 
Not a Viable Solution to the Access to Medicine Problem, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1191, 1192–93 
(2013). 
 148  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 31.  
 149  Id. at art. 31(b). 
 150  Id. at arts. 7, 8, 31(b); Johanna Kiehl, TRIPS Article 31(b) and the HIV/AIDS 
Epidemic, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 164 (2002).  Kiehl states: 
According to Canada, Article 7 makes the balance between the 
intellectual property rights created by the Agreement and other 
important socio-economic policies of WTO Member governments one 
of the TRIPS Agreement’s key goals.  Furthermore, Article 8 elaborates 
the socio-economic policies in question, with particular attention to 
health and nutritional policies.  The European Communities, in 
comparison, viewed Articles 7 and 8 as statements that describe the 
balancing of goals that had already taken place in negotiating the final 
texts of the TRIPS Agreement.   
Id. at 164 (footnotes omitted).  See also Jennifer R. Andrew, Swine Flu, Bird Flu, SARS, 
Oh My! Applying the Precautionary Principle to Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals under 
Article 31 of TRIPS, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 405, 435 (2011).  Andrew reasons that, 
according to the plain terms of Article 8.1, public health measures adopted by 
Members must be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement (such as TRIPS 
Article 27.1 discussed below) and “necessary” to protect public health.  A panel will 
find that TRIPS Article 31(b) public health emergency legislation is not consistent with 
TRIPS Article 27.1, that it is not “necessary” under Article 8.1, and that when the other 
terms of Article 31 are applied in the HIV/AIDS context, it upsets the basic balance of 
EFFINGHAM (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  11:50 AM 
2016] COMMENT 901 
where life-threatening epidemics hinder an LDC’s economic growth.151  
It is more acceptable to issue compulsory licenses for HIV/AIDS 
because the LDCs requesting them are usually impacted to the point 
where much of their populations are affected, and the countries do 
not have the wherewithal to stop the epidemic.152 
Thailand’s current compulsory licenses have implicitly exceeded 
the scope of Article 31(b).  What began as a way for the country to fight 
its HIV/AIDS crisis has evolved into a way for Thailand to escape 
developing its own infrastructure and technological base needed to 
create its own medicines.  While heart disease and cancer may affect a 
large population of Thai citizens, these diseases do not rise to the level 
of epidemic proportions requiring the need for compulsory licenses. 
VII. SOLUTIONS TO THE CURRENT PATENT REGIME 
In order to incentivize LDCs to utilize the TRIPS Article 31(b) 
exception without exploiting it, this Comment proposes two domestic 
solutions: (1) a Regulatory Solution and (2) a Patent Lifespan 
Extension Solution.  Alternatively, in order to discourage LDCs from 
exploiting the TRIPS Article 31(b) exception, this Comment proposes 
a Suspension Solution. 
 
the Agreement.  Id. at 435.   
 151  See WTO Declaration, supra note 78.  It provides in relevant part:  
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems 
afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, 
especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria 
and other epidemics.  
3. We recognize that intellectual property protection is important 
for the development of new medicines. We also recognize the 
concerns about its effects on prices.  
5. (c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes 
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, 
it being understood that public health crises, including those 
relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, 
can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency.  
Id.  See also Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The Supreme 
Court in PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777, 796 (2004).   
 152  See, e.g., Gathii, supra note 113, at 961 (“[T]he long term health interests of the 
population of African countries should be given more weight than the property rights 
interests that would be injured by compulsory licensing of essential medicines.”); see 
also Halajian, supra note 147, at 1192–93 (“Developing countries often lack the 
capabilities and infrastructure to create IP, such as patentable drugs, and are thus 
primarily IP importers, and lack an incentive to protect IP.  These countries favor 
weaker IP rights, which allow market entry of generic drug manufacturers and 
increased market competition.  Market entry and competition lower drug prices, 
resulting in increased availability of affordable medications.”).   
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A. Regulatory Solution 
The Regulatory Solution would consist of the American Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) pausing, or slowing down, the passage rate 
of new and developing American pharmaceuticals.  This would take 
place until American pharmaceutical companies help LDCs by 
providing generic drug patent information, manufacturing medicines, 
and/or distributing medicines.  This regulatory solution would 
prevent American pharmaceutical companies from bringing new 
drugs to market until they comply with the compulsory licenses issued 
to them. 
Although it is uncommon for a pharmaceutical company to 
blatantly refuse to comply with compulsory licenses, there are instances 
where American pharmaceuticals are skirting, avoiding, or prolonging 
the process.  For example, “Thailand issued compulsory licenses to 
achieve its mandate of providing access to essential drugs after years of 
negotiation with patent owners failed to yield price cuts beyond the 
level of currency appreciation.”153  These lengthy negotiations, 
spanning a number of years without ultimately leading to a reduction 
in cost, give the impression that some companies are attempting to 
circumvent the compulsory license.154 
The Regulatory Solution would ensure a more direct form of 
compliance by promoting the use of compulsory licenses as an effective 
negotiation tool155 when pharmaceutical companies are completely 
unresponsive to the drug needs of LDCs.  Such a solution would also 
support the U.N.’s recognition that all people have a fundamental 
right to health156 by more readily providing medicines to LDCs. 
An impediment to this solution, however, is the FDA.  With the 
ability to make its own rules and the ability to control which 
pharmaceutical drugs are brought to market, the FDA is the only 
regulatory body that could prevent American pharmaceutical 
companies from bringing new drugs to market.  This regulatory body 
“has the authority to issue its own rules so long as they support the 
intent of the statutes and regulations which they are intended to 
 
 153  See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 
1047, 1062 (2009).  
 154  Id.  
 155  Feldman, supra note 6, at 155 (“In the past, Brazil, for example has successfully 
used compulsory licenses as a tool to negotiate lower prices from both Merck and 
Roche.”). 
 156  WORLD HEALTH ORG. CONST. pmbl., opened for signature July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 
2679, 14 U.N.T.S. 185, http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who_ 
constitution_en.pdf; see also Fidler, supra note 113, at 194.  
EFFINGHAM (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2016  11:50 AM 
2016] COMMENT 903 
enforce.”157  Additionally, no medicine can be sold in the United States 
without FDA approval.158  In order for a medicine to obtain approval, 
the pharmaceutical company must complete the Investigational New 
Drug Application.159  This application is supported by all of the 
research and clinical trials that the drug has undergone.160  After 
successful completion of the application, the FDA deems the drug safe 
and effective.161  Because the FDA is able to make its own regulations, 
it could make rules to enforce such a solution. 
The FDA, however, may not be able to make such a regulation.  
Professor Peter Schuck has stated that “[m]any critics denounce the 
agency’s enforcement activity as lax and inadequate,” and “some go so 
far as to claim that the regulated industries have ‘captured [the 
FDA],’” thus making it impossible for it to regulate effectively.162  He 
continued to explain that a recent examination of various industries’ 
influence over Congress found pharmaceutical companies to be the 
most influential over Congress.163  Considering how much power 
pharmaceutical companies wield over the FDA, it is unlikely that such 
a solution could even be considered. 
 
 157  Jennifer S. Bard, What to Do When You Can’t Hear the Whistleblowing: A Proposal to 
Protect the Public’s Health by Providing Whistleblower Protection for Medical Researchers, 9 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 1, 17 (2012) (citing Julia Kobick, Negotiated Rulemaking: The Next Step in 
Regulatory Innovation at the Food And Drug Administration?, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 425, 434 
(2010) (“FDA has never voluntarily convened a rulemaking negotiation, and Congress 
has never statutorily mandated that FDA establish an ad hoc negotiated rulemaking 
committee.”)).  
 158  W. Christopher Matton & F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance: Federal 
Regulation of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 283, 293–96 (2004). 
 159  Id. at 295. 
 160  Id.  
 161  Id.  
 162  Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the 
Sweet Sport, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 112 (2008).  
 163  Id.; see also Jennifer S. Bard, Putting Patients First: How the FDA Could Use Its 
Existing Powers to Reduce Post-Market Adverse Events, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 495, 553 
(2013) (“The most likely source of congressional power to regulate prescription drugs 
is found in the power the Constitution gives Congress in Article I, Section 8 to regulate 
commerce.”); Eric R. Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the Command-and-
Control Model of Regulation, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 105, 118–21 (2004) (explaining how 
Congress initially conferred to the FDA, an executive agency, the power to enforce 
regulations and how its power has since expanded to include the rulemaking powers 
and the promulgation of procedural regulations); Kate Cook, The Presidential FDA: 
Politics Meets Science, DIGITAL ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP AT HARVARD, 5–6  
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8852216 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) 
(explaining the mechanisms Congress possess to control the FDA). 
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B. Patent Lifespan Extension Solution 
The second domestic solution this Comment proposes is a Patent 
Lifespan Extension Solution.  In this solution, the U.S. Patent Office 
would allow pharmaceutical companies that willingly participate in 
compulsory licensing to extend their patent lifespan by several months 
or a year.  This solution would serve as a more “pharma-friendly” 
option to American pharmaceutical companies than the first proposed 
Regulatory Solution. 
This patent lifespan extension could potentially be promulgated 
through the Hatch-Waxman Act.164  Before the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
generic drug companies that wished to sell and market off-patent 
drugs needed to go through the same rigorous FDA approval process 
that new brand-name drugs went through.165  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
effectively changed that and, among other patent protections for 
pharmaceutical companies, provided for patent term extensions 
averaging three years.166  Given that a typical patent lifespan lasts twenty 
years, the patent term extensions were necessary since the term 
realistically only lasts about seventeen years because the patent 
application and FDA approval process take approximately three 
years.167  Given the Hatch-Waxman Act’s existing ability to extend 
patent terms, the suggested patent lifespan extension solution is a 
cohesive and consistent addition to its already existing powers.  The 
timeframe given to pharmaceutical companies that comply with 
compulsory licensing would be “inserted” after the time in which a 
patent is currently set to expire and the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
extension term, immediately preceding the time in which a generic 
company may apply for the patent.  While this solution may constrain 
domestic, generic pharmaceutical companies’ access to brand name 
drugs, it promotes the betterment of international public policy by 
advancing LDCs’ access to medicines—a primary goal of the TRIPS 
Agreement.168 
 
 
 164  See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 
& 35 U.S.C.). 
 165  Amanda Baltazar, The Hatch-Waxman Act, ABOUT MONEY, http://pharmacy. 
about.com/od/Glossary/a/The-Hatch-Waxman-Act.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).  
 166  Id.  
 167   WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41114, THE 
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 3 (2012), 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/R41114_031320
13.pdf. 
 168  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at arts. 7, 8.  
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This solution may be workable given that pharmaceutical 
companies are largely driven by corporate profits.169  In fact, the WHO 
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public 
Health (CIPIH) recognizes that profits drive pharmaceutical 
companies.170  If pharmaceutical companies are able to dominate the 
American market for several months (or a year) longer by having their 
patent lifespans extended domestically, they have the ability to 
produce hundreds of millions, or even billions, of dollars in additional 
profit.171  The benefit of this is to recoup the millions of dollars lost in 
the R&D process. 
Profits, however, are never guaranteed: “With the exception of a 
few blockbuster drugs, the commercial success rate of pharmaceuticals 
remains low.  In fact, just two out of ten medicines ever produce 
revenues that match or exceed average R&D costs.”172  In order to make 
up for the low rates of return for many drugs, this Patent Lifespan 
Extension Solution would incentivize domestic pharmaceutical 
companies to help LDCs by providing generic drug information. 
Generally, public policy wants to promote generic drug 
competition, and this solution is in conflict with that ideal.173  A major 
factor in the promotion of generic drugs is that it can reduce public 
healthcare costs in one of three ways: (1) generic substitution of drugs 
for the therapeutically equivalent branded drug;174 (2) therapeutic 
 
 169  Jennifer A. Lazo, The Life-Saving Medicines Export Act: Why the Proposed U.S. 
Compulsory Licensing Scheme Will Fail to Export Any Medicines or Save Any Lives, 33 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 237, 270–71 (2007). 
 170  Id. 
 171  See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 637, 675 (2013) (“[A] single patent—particularly a patent on a successful 
pharmaceutical—could be worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars per 
year.”).  
 172  Stuart R. Cohn & Erin M. Swick, The Sitting Ducks of Securities Class Action 
Litigation: Bio-Pharmas and the Need for Improved Evaluation of Scientific Data, 35 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 911, 916 (2010) (citing Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am., Pharmaceutical 
Industry Profile 2009, 38–39 (2009)).  
 173  Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 248 (2012) (“The 
Hatch-Waxman Act therefore promotes generic market entry by relieving almost all of 
the regulatory burdens for generic manufacturers, as well as by helping generic 
manufacturers challenge the validity of brand-name pharmaceutical patents that 
might be hindering such market entry.”). 
 174  “Therapeutically equivalent” drugs are those that have the same active 
ingredient, strength, dosage form, and route of administration.  Substitution can be 
made by either a prescriber or a pharmacist, according to state regulations and laws.  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 2–3 (2010), 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/76151/ib.pdf. 
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substitution;175 and (3) reduction in the price of brand name drugs 
paid by consumers resulting from generic substitution.176  The rate at 
which generic drugs are substituted (when there is a generic substitute 
available) is nearly ninety percent, which accounted for a savings of 
$121 billion in 2008.177  Therefore, a plan that delays generic drug 
competition would hinder the savings to the domestic market.  It is 
likely the American public who would oppose this solution because the 
solution would suppress the free-flow of medicines in the domestic 
market by constricting who the manufacturers are for an even longer 
period of time than before.178 
When contrasted with the international public healthcare benefit, 
however, this patent lifespan extension scheme seems the most viable 
solution.  Extending the patent lifespan for American pharmaceutical 
companies could generate revenue on their name-brand drugs, which 
in turn could offset the cost of participating in the compulsory license.  
The American generic market would be delayed slightly thereby 
hindering domestic savings but it would be at a cost that benefits 
international public health.  Thus, this solution presents several 
hurdles but is more realistic than the first Regulatory Solution. 
C. Suspension Solution 
In order to discourage LDCs from exploiting the TRIPS Article 
31(b) exception, this Comment proposes a Suspension Solution.  The 
WTO can discourage or prohibit LDCs from exceeding the bounds of 
 
 175  “Therapeutic substitution” is switching from a branded drug to a generic in the 
same therapeutic class.  Only a prescriber may make this substitution; a pharmacist 
may not do this because the drugs are not therapeutically equivalent.  Id. at 4. 
 176  Id. at 3–4. 
 177  ALAN SHEPPARD, GENETIC MEDICINES: ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE LONG-
TERM HEALTH OF SOCIETY, IMS HEALTH 3 (2010), 
http://www.sandoz.com/cs/www.sandoz.com-v4/assets/media/shared/documents/ 
press_releases/100401_Generic_Medicines_GA.pdf.  
 178  See, e.g., Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent 
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 
1314 (2013) (“On the issue of patent reform, a civil war of sorts divides the technology 
community.  Battle lines are drawn largely between industries.  Pharmaceutical 
companies, on one side, argue that strong patent rights are crucial to continued 
innovation.  High-tech firms, on the other, view the patent system as more foe than 
friend.”); Thomas H. Kramer, Proposed Legislative Solutions to the Non-Practicing Entity 
Patent Assertion Problem: The Risks for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 39 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 467, 479–81 (2014) (explaining that technology and pharmaceutical industries 
bitterly dispute more or less regulated patent regimes, with technology industries 
wanting more lax laws and pharmaceutical industries wanting more stringent 
protection).  
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Article 31(b) by suspending member countries that violate it.179  Under 
this solution, the WTO would create an international committee that 
could investigate allegations of misuse.  The committee would have the 
authority to suspend countries from the WTO if found guilty of 
practices that do not conform with proper patent protection policy.  
This solution would serve to deter countries, like Thailand, from 
engaging in practices that are not necessarily initiated because of a 
national emergency. 
The suspension solution may be a viable resolution because the 
WTO would not need to create another enforcement body to 
moderate these disputes.  The TRIPS Agreement already has a dispute 
settlement process built into it—the DSB.  The DSB has the authority 
to issue trade sanctions against member countries and serves as an 
enforcement mechanism for all WTO issues, including conflicts 
regarding the TRIPS Agreement.180  It also settles most disputes within 
fifteen months, although countries can settle their dispute themselves 
at any stage.181  This enforcement mechanism could serve as the 
 
 179  WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 58 (2007), http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf.  Before trade sanctions are imposed, 
the complaining party (referred to as the “plaintiff” for purposes of this Comment) 
must bring a complaint before the DSB.  Id.  If the DSB finds that the opposing party 
(referred to as the “defendant” for purposes of this Comment) is in fact noncompliant, 
it will make recommendations for how the defendant can bring its policy up to the 
status quo.  Id.  If the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time, it 
must enter into negotiations with the plaintiff to determine acceptable 
compensation—i.e., tariff reductions, etc.  Id.  And if no satisfactory compensation 
agreement is reached, the plaintiff may ask the DSB to impose limited trade sanctions.  
Id. 
 180  See id. at 55–57.  
 181  Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Feb. 
11, 2016).  The website explains:  
Dispute settlement is the central pillar of the multilateral trading system, 
and the WTO’s unique contribution to the stability of the global 
economy.  Without a means of settling disputes, the rules-based system 
would be less effective because the rules could not be enforced.  The 
WTO’s procedure underscores the rule of law, and it makes the trading 
system more secure and predictable.  The system is based on clearly-
defined rules, with timetables for completing a case.  First rulings are 
made by a panel and endorsed (or rejected) by the WTO’s full 
membership.  Appeals based on points of law are possible . . . . However, 
the point is not to pass judgement [sic].  The priority is to settle disputes, 
through consultations if possible . . . . If a case runs its full course to a 
first ruling, it should not normally take more than about one year—15 
months if the case is appealed.  The agreed time limits are flexible, and 
if the case is considered urgent (e.g. if perishable goods are involved), it 
is accelerated as much as possible. 
Id.  
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tribunal to investigate practices of excessive compulsory licensing. 
The advantage of this solution is that the DSB already exists as a 
functioning dispute resolution body.  Therefore, this solution would 
require less of a drastic change compared to the other two proposed 
solutions.  The disadvantages of this solution are twofold: (1) it may 
not serve public health goals and (2) actions that exceed the bounds 
of the TRIPS purpose are not easily defined.  The first drawback is in 
conflict with Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement, which encourages 
member countries to take measures necessary to protect public health 
and to promote socio-economic development.182  When compared to 
this purpose of the TRIPS Agreement, this solution may not be 
viable.183 
The second disadvantage of this solution is that it would require 
a consensus among member countries as to what constitute a practice 
that misuses the Article 31(b) exception—a feat that may be easier said 
than accomplished.  The DSB is currently set up in a way that 
establishes “panels” of well-qualified experts to consider a case, and 
panelists are typically chosen in consultation with the countries in 
dispute.184  Since the DSB already chooses panelists with the help of the 
parties, there may be less of a dispute about what constitutes a practice 
that misuses the Article 31(b) exception. 
Furthermore, the DSB was marked at its inception as a kind of 
“Star Chamber” decision-making process, which gave rise to questions 
of its transparency.185  Since the Seattle Ministerial of 1999, there have 
been three major changes to the WTO that have increased its 
transparency, which include: (1) public access to documentation 
through its website;186 (2) acceptance of amicus curiae briefs in both 
panel and Appellate Body proceedings; and (3) public participation in 
the WTO adjudicating bodies, committees, and councils.187  Despite 
these changes, much of the DSB’s activity remains confidential.188  
Therefore, in order for the suspension solution to be viable, the DSB 
 
 182  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at art. 8. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution, supra note 181. 
 185  Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the 
First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 44–45 (1999). 
 186  With regard to dispute settlement body, “the availability of documentation 
varies depending on the particular stage of the process” that a case is in.  Most dispute-
related documents, however, are not automatically made public in an effort to protect 
confidential information.  Gabrielle Marceau & Mikella Hurley, Transparency and Public 
Participation in the WTO: A Report Card on WTO Transparency Mechanisms, 4 TRADE L. & 
DEV., no. 1, 2012, at 24, 24–25.  
 187  Id. at 23, 28, 36. 
 188  Id. at 43. 
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would need to overhaul its confidential process in order to further 
increase its transparency and legitimize its decision-making process. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although Thailand’s repetitive use of compulsory licensing is not 
considered a per se violation of the TRIPS Agreement, the country’s 
actions seem suspicious.  It is understandable and acceptable that an 
LDC seeks a compulsory license to treat its growing HIV/AIDS 
epidemic.  Compulsory licensing for cancer and heart disease 
medicines, however, do not seem to constitute exigent circumstances, 
given that many other countries across the globe face similar health 
concerns.  Undoubtedly, cancer and heart disease are leading causes 
of death, but they are not infectious.  They do not spread rapidly 
through under-educated and destitute countries the way HIV/AIDS 
does.  And while many people in Thailand may be suffering from 
cancer and heart disease, compulsory licensing should not be a means 
to an end. 
Rather than resorting to compulsory licensing, Thailand should 
first divert more resources to increasing its infrastructure so it may 
complete its own R&D for new medicines.  Alternatively, Thailand 
could manufacture and distribute off-patent generic drugs—a business 
model that many American generic pharmaceutical companies have, 
with lower cost being a driving factor.  This solution is even more 
feasible given Thailand’s moderate-income status. 
Besides domestic steps that Thailand can take, WTO members 
internationally and the United States domestically can take initiatives 
to prevent the kinds of practices that Thailand is engaging in, namely 
through the Patent Lifespan Extension Solution and the Suspension 
Solution.  The Patent Lifespan Extension Solution is a way to 
encourage domestic pharmaceutical companies to help LDCs that are 
in dire need of medicines.  Alternatively, the Suspension Solution is a 
way to discourage countries like Thailand that exceed the reasonable 
bounds of compulsory licensing from misusing Article 31(b) to their 
own benefit.  Admittedly, both of these solutions need to be examined 
and discussed further before implementation.  They do, however, 
provide a basis to change the current patent regime that would further 
effectuate the overall purpose of the TRIPS Agreement—access to 
necessary medicines for all. 
 
